



MONTENEGRIN JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume 2, 2018. Issue 1.

CIP - Каталогизacija y publikaciji
Национална библиотека Црне Горе, Цетиње
COBISS.CG-ID 32743952

ISSN 2536-5592

Publisher



Center for Geopolitical Studies

Časopis *Montenegrin Journal for Social Sciences* upisan je u evidenciju
medija, Ministarstva kulture Crne Gore pod rednim brojem 782.

MJSS
MONTENEGRIN JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume 2, 2017. Issue 1. Podgorica June 2018.

Editor in Chief: Živko Andrijašević

Editors: Adnan Prekić, Dragutin Papović, Ivan Tepavčević

International editorial board: John K. Cox, North Dakota State University, Fargo, UNITED STATES; Tvrtko Jakovina, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, CROATIA; Lidia Greco, University of Bari, Bari, ITALY; Helena Binti Muhamad Varkkey, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA; Vít Hloušek, Masaryk University, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC; Adrian Hatos, Universitatea „Babeş-Bolyai” Cluj, ROMANIA.

Montenegrin Journal for Social Sciences is indexed in: CEOL-Central and Eastern European Online; Google Scholar; Index Copernicus; CiteFactor; Scientific Indexing Services (SIS); ISRA-Journal impact factor; Electronic Journals Library; ROAD; General Impact Factor; OAJI - Open Academic Journals Index.

Proofreading and lecture: Danijela Milićević

Address: Danila Bojovića bb 81 400 Niksic, Montenegro;

E-mail: mjss@ac.me

www.mjss.ac.me

Prepress and print: Pro file – Podgorica

Circulation: 200 copies

CONTENTS:

MONTENEGRIN STATE IDEA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY
FIRST CENTURY

Zivko ANDRIJASEVIC.....7

THE NEW APPROACH OF THE US ADMINISTRATION TOWARDS THE
WESTERN BALKANS

Damir MARUSIC.....25

VOTER MOBILIZATION IN A FROZEN ENVIRONMENT: A COMPARISON
OF OLD AND NEW CANVASSING APPROACHES IN MONTENEGRO

Nemanja STANKOV.....35

DENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT APPLICATION
AND TECHNIQUES

Marija EDINBOROUGH.....55

INDUSTRIAL HERITAGE MANAGEMENT: POLISH PERSPECTIVE

Weronika POKOJSKA.....73

ETHICS AND HEROISM IN ORAL TRADITION OF THE MONTENEGRIN
NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Jovana DJURIC.....85

REVIEWS:.....99

BOOK REVIEW: WHEN SCIENCE OVERCOMES IDEOLOGY

Zivko Andrijasevic, Montenegrin ideology 1860-1918.

Montenegrin state ideology during the reign Nikola I Petrovic Njegos,
Cetinje 2017.

Milivoj BESLIN.....101

REVIEW: SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE prof. dr Branislav Bato Kovačević –
Nikšić, 10. april 2018.

MarijanPREMOVIC.....105

Glavni i odgovorni urednik: Živko Andrijašević

Urednici: Adnan Prekić, Dragutin Papović, Ivan Tepavčević

Međunarodni uređivački odbor: John K. Cox, North Dakota State University, Fargo, UNITED STATES; Tvrtko Jakovina, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, CROATIA; Lidia Greco, University of Bari, Bari, ITALY; Helena Binti Muhamad Varkkey, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA; Vít Hloušek, Masaryk University, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC; Adrian Hatos, Universitatea „Babeş-Bolyai” Cluj, ROMANIA.

Montenegrin Journal for Social Sciences indeksira se u sledećim naučnim bazama: CEOL-Central and Eastern European Online; Google Scholar; Index Copernicus; CiteFactor; Scientific Indexing Services (SIS); ISRA-Journal impact factor; Electronic Journals Library; ROAD; General Impact Factor; OAJI - Open Academic Journals Index.

Lektura i korektura: Danijela Milićević

Adresa: Danila Bojovića bb 81 400 Nikšić, Crna Gora;

E-mail: mjss@ac.me

www.mjss.ac.me

Priprema i štampa: Pro file – Podgorica

Tiraž: 200

SADRŽAJ:

CRNOGORSKA DRŽAVNA IDEJA NA POČETKU 21.VIJEKA Živko ANDRIJAŠEVIĆ	7
NOVI PRISTUP AMERIČKE ADMINISTRACIJE PREMA ZAPADNOM BALKANU Damir MARUŠIĆ	25
MOBILIZACIJA GLASAČA U STATIČNOM OKRUŽENJU: POREĐENJE STAROG I NOVOG PRISTUPA PRIDOBIVANJA GLASAČA U CRNOJ GORI Nemanja STANKOV	35
DENTALNA ANTROPOLOGIJA: PRIKAZ TEHNIKA I VAŽEĆE PRIMJENE Marija EDINBOROUGH	55
UPRAVLJANJE INDUSTRIJSKIM NASLJEĐEM: ISKUSTVA POLJSKE Weronika POKOJSKA	73
ČOJSTVO I JUNAŠTVO U USMENOJ TRADICIJI CRNOGORSKOG NACIONALNOG POKRETA Jovana ĐURIĆ	85
PRIKAZI:	99
PRIKAZ KNJIGE: KADA NAUKA SAVLADA IDEOLOGIJU (Živko Andrijašević, Crnogorska ideologija 1860–1918. Državna ideologija Crne Gore u vrijeme vladavine Nikole I Petrovića Njegoša, Cetinje, 2017.) Milivoj BEŠLIN	101
OSVRT SA NAUČNE KONFERENCIJE: prof. dr Branislav Bato Kovačević – Nikšić, 10. april 2018. MarijanPREMOVIĆ	105

Original scientific papers**VOTER MOBILIZATION IN A FROZEN ENVIRONMENT:
A COMPARISON OF OLD AND NEW CANVASSING APPROACHES
IN MONTENEGRO**Nemanja STANKOV¹

University of Montenegro-Faculty of Political Sciences

Address: Ul. 13. jula br. 2, 81000, Podgorica

nstankov42@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Field experimentation of canvassing effect on turnout has grown significantly since Gerber and Green's seminal work in New Haven. This study is an attempt to adapt the large literature on the USA, to estimate the canvassing success/failure in a small and socially highly intercorrelated Montenegrin society. A popular wisdom suggests that the most effective mobilization strategy in small communities is door-to-door canvassing as it ensures personalized appeal and personalized content of the message. I test this assumption in a political context where political contestation (and party preferences) are frozen along ethnic cleavage lines. Using propensity score matching I demonstrate that contact during the campaign did not effect overall turnout rates, but that there were differences between canvassing approaches. Namely, phone and SMS contact did decrease turnout and imply a hierarchy of techniques where phone and SMS contact signals some sort of disrespect and levity in a small society. Moving on to specific mobilization efforts, I demonstrate that SMS message on the Election Day in 2016 parliamentary elections did not have any effect on overall turnout rates. The results are discussed in the context of previous literature findings.

KEY WORDS:

Montenegro; Voter mobilization; SMS contact; Matching.

1 Nemanja Stankov is a PhD candidate at the Doctoral school of Political Science, Central European University in Budapest. In his research Nemanja Stankov mostly deals with psychological basis of ideological preferences on individual level and his research and scientific interest also include issues related to political communication, voter mobilization, experimental, quantitative methodology and statistics.

SAŽETAK:

Terenski eksperimenti na temu učinka kontakta na izlaznost značajno su češći od Gerberovog i Grenovog istraživanja u Nju Hejvenu. Ovo istraživanje je pokušaj prilagodjavanja opširne literature o SAD-u, kako bi se procijenio uspjeh/neuspjeh mobilizacije glasača u malom i veoma međusobno povezanom crnogorskom društvu. Popularna mudrost sugeriše da je najefektivnija strategija mobilizacije u malim zajednicama kampanja od vrata do vrata jer osigurava personalizovan sadržaj poruke. Ova pretpostavka testirana je u političkom kontekstu u kojem se politička utakmica (i stranačke preferencije) zamrzavaju duž etničkog društvenog rascjepa. Koristeći tehniku mečinga pokazujem da kontakt tokom kampanje nije uticao na ukupnu izlaznost na parlamentarnim izborima 2016., ali da postoje razlike između korišćenih tehnika kontakta. Naime, kontakt telefonom i SMS-om smanjio je izlaznost i signalizira postojanje hijerarhije tehnika u kojima telefonski i SMS kontakt signaliziraju neku vrstu nepoštovanja prema glasačima u malim zajednicama. U nastavku rada, fokusiram se na specifične mobilizacione događaje, gdje rezultati pokazuju da SMS poruka na dan parlamentarnih izbora u oktobru 2016. godine, nije imala uticaj na ukupnu izlaznost. Zaključak stavlja rezultate studije u kontekst prethodnih nalaza iz literature.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI:

Crna Gora; Mobilizacija glasača; SMS kontakt; mečing.

Introduction

The Election Day in 2016 was the most politically eventful day in recent Montenegrin history. Most notably, it will be remembered as the day when the alleged² attempt of *coup d'etat* was prevented and the culprits arrested. On the Election Day, Special State Prosecutor Milovoje Katnić held a press conference claiming that a group of foreign citizens planned on executing a *coup* by assassinating the leader of the ruling party Milo Đukanović and opening fire on citizens gathered in front of the Parliament later that evening. Furthermore, Katnić claimed, they planned on forcefully entering the Parliament and taking control over the Montenegrin institutions. Ultimately, Katnić concluded, the disaster was prevented by a swift response from the State Prosecutor Office and Police Department, arresting the culprits and securing peace.

Amidst these important and potentially threatening events, a voter mobilization battle was raging. Shortly after noon on the Election Day, citizens of Montenegro started receiving SMS messages on Viber and WhatsApp claiming the involvement of the ruling party (Democratic Party of Socialist - DPS) in vote buying and electoral fraud, calling voters to take to the polls.³ This was the first time that any party used tools such as Viber or WhatsApp to distribute messages to the electorate. The governmental response followed shortly, instructing internet providers to disable access to popular online messaging services Viber and WhatsApp. The unfolding of events suggests that both sides operated on the same assumption, that is, that Viber and WhatsApp messages can be used as a successful tool of political mobilization and can affect the outcome of the elections. However, this belief has stayed on the level of assumption without strong empirical support. It is the aim of this paper to evaluate the relative importance of the Election Day communication efforts. In other words, one of the key research question of the paper is has this specific message exert any influence on the Election Day decision to take to the polls and vote? Apart from this

² The epilogue of judicial proceedings on the alleged *coup d'etat* is expected within the next year.

³ The message distributed via Viber and WhatsApp: Democratic Party of Socialist is organizing Bosniaks and Albanians and the entire diaspora and paying 250 Euro for a vote. Zijad Skrijelj, who resides in France told reporters of Vijesti that he was phoned by Izet Skrijelj from the municipal offices of DPS in Petnjica, who promised him 250 Euro for travel expenses. This is happening all over Montenegro among Bosniaks and Albanians. Do not let DPS steal yet another election - take to the polls and vote!!! - Demokratska partija socijalista (DPS) organizuje Bošnjake i Albance i cijelu dijasporu i plaća 250 eura glas. Zijad Škrijelj, nastanjen u Francuskoj kazao je 'Vijestima' da ga je zvao Izet Škrijelj koji je član mjesnog odbora DPS-a u Petnjici, I obećao mu 250 EUR za putne troškove. Ovo se dešava širom Crne Gore medju Bošnjacima i Albancima. Ne dozvolite DPS-u da ukrade još jedne izbore - izadjite i glasajte!!!

specific question, more broadly, I look at whether personalized contact increases the individual propensity to vote? Moreover, are there any variations in the relationship conditioned on the type of recruitment used (personal, SMS, email, etc.)?

Most notably, the majority of work in the field of contact and turnout, builds on the seminal work of Gerber and Green (1999) who ascertain that canvassing does increase turnout rates. In their later work Gerber and Green (2000, 2001), the authors expand and compare the effect of various contact techniques building on the assumption that personal canvassers mobilize voters more effectively than through other modes of contact. However, this is not to say that other contacting techniques are ineffective. Along those lines, Suarez (2006) concludes that mobile phones have the potential to foster political mobilization, especially for young voters (see also: Osborn, McClurg, and Knoll 2010). Similarly, phone canvassing (Adams and Smith 1980; Nickerson 2007), and leaflets (Nickerson 2006) are found to be cost effective in getting people to the polls. Although informative, these studies were conducted in large communities where we should not expect the choice of voter mobilization technique to have a specific social (symbolic) meaning. Along those lines, research has shown that in large communities it is not the medium of message transmission that makes the difference, but rather the personalized account of the message (Nickerson 2007). However, this is not the case in Montenegro. In small and interconnected communities, personal canvassing should signal party devotion and dedication to the electorate, while SMS, phone or online contact could represent disrespect and levity. The question that naturally arises is what are the differences in the effects of these mobilization techniques on turnout?

Building on previous research on mobilization I assume all mobilization techniques are effective on mobilizing the voters to take to the polls, I also assume that the Election Day message did have an effect on turnout and has effectively increased the number of voters who took to the polls. These assumptions were put to an empirical test using logistic regression in the first stage, and comparison based on propensity score matching in the second. Using a quasi-experimental design in propensity score matching allowed for more robust estimation and a causal inference from observational data. Specific events on the Election Day regarding the Viber and WhatsApp messages had no association with overall turnout. However, the analysis did show that mobilization strategies based on phone and SMS contact functioned

in the opposite direction and were related with decreased turnout in 2016 Montenegrin parliamentary elections. These results provide partial evidence to support the claim that in small communities door-to-door canvassing is regarded as a signal of devotion and respect for voters.

The value of looking at the Montenegrin case comes from the fact that it enables the evaluation of the effect of the new technologies on turnout rates in a small and relatively conservative environment. More to the point, the relative size of Montenegrin society (600,000 respectively) is assumed to give a disproportionate advantage to personal canvassing over all other modes of political recruitment. That is why the value of personal contact in a small community is higher and has more symbolic meaning than in a large society.

A very condensed description of party competition in Montenegro

The nature of Montenegrin party competition is characterized by two important dimensions. The first is the long-lasting dominance of Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the only party in the post-communist Europe that has never lost national elections from the time of introduction of pluralism. Since its foundation in 1991, as the continuation of League of Communists of Montenegro, the party survived and thrived under conditions of political turmoil and has defined itself as a predominant party in Montenegrin political system. During this period, DPS has built a strong and stable electoral base that does not fluctuate between electoral cycles. Along those lines, Montenegro is one of the post-communist countries with the smallest rates of electoral volatility⁴.

The second, country voted for independence from Serbia and Montenegro, on 2006 Referendum with a narrow majority (55,1%⁵) and the political competition organized between the independence and unionist block is still influential in Montenegrin politics. This divide is all but absolute, as the process of nation building undergone after the referendum (national anthem, symbols, language) only reinforced the existing political competitions and froze it on ethnic cleavage lines. This process is far from over, as we are yet to witness institutional solution for the issue associated

4 Pedersen index of electoral volatility for the last two electoral cycles (2012-2016) was 14.4.

5 The requirement for the validity of the referendum results was set to 55% for independence, as required by international (EU) mediators Miroslav Lajčák and František Lipka.

with two Orthodox churches in Montenegro (Serbian Orthodox and Montenegrin Orthodox, respectively).

Combined, these two dimensions shape electoral affiliation of voters and structure them basically into two blocks. One block revolves around DPS and its coalition partners (small Montenegrin, Boshniak, Albanian and Croatian parties), that were historically for independence, and the other block of opposition party voters that were historically on the pro-unionist side (although Social Democratic Party that was in coalition government for over a decade is not firmly in the opposition). This fact limits the pool of voters available for mobilization but also can influence the choice of strategies employed.

Mobilization Techniques and Electoral Turnout

In what manner are the dimensions of party competition reflected in voter mobilization field? Small rates of volatility and party competition organized on ethnic cleavage lines limit the political manoeuvre that parties can employ in poaching and mobilizing voters. There arises a question: Are mobilization techniques effective in such an environment? In other words, do they increase electoral turnout in a cost-effective manner? The general attempts at answering these questions in large communities date back several decades yielding mixed results (see Blydenburgh 1971; Adams and Smith 1980; Miller, Bositis, and Baer 1981), however, since the seminal work of Gerber and Green (1999) the scholarship seems to have reached a consensus that mobilization techniques do increase electoral turnout (see also: Green and Gerber 2015). Following the consensus, literature has turned to exploring additional question such as whether the partisan or nonpartisan type of message makes a difference (Panagopoulos 2011; Nickerson 2006), whether the timing of the message is important (Panagopoulos 2011), type of message for minority groups (Michelson 2003), or whether the specific mobilization techniques (door-to-door, phone, email, SMS etc.) are more effective than others (Gerber and Green 2000, 2005).

To begin this exploration, I focus on the type of message that is conveyed in the mobilization effort. Traditional canvassing experiments used nonpartisan messages in *Get Out To Vote* campaigns (GOTV) aimed at increasing overall turnout rates, rather than mobilizing voters to vote for a specific candidate/party (see: Gerber

and Green 1999, 2000). Following this reasoning, some have argued that the results of these experiments cannot be used to evaluate the effects of partisan mobilization campaigns, as partisan mobilization messages focus on both mobilization and persuasion (Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006). Furthermore, it is possible that nonpartisan mobilizers are perceived as more trustworthy and without self-interest. Following these distinctions, early on, the assumption was that partisan and non-partisan mobilization might affect turnout rates differently (Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006). Contrary to the assumption, several studies found that partisan mobilization influences both preferences (Blydenburgh 1971) and turnout (Blydenburgh 1971; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006) in the same manner as non-partisan canvassing (Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006). More recently, scholarship provided further evidence to substantiate these claims that partisan messages are as effective as nonpartisan ones in mobilizing voters (Panagopoulos 2011).

The above-mentioned studies, as well as the majority of studies in the field, assume that the partisan mobilization efforts have a positive effect⁶ on turnout and that the aim of the partisan mobilization campaign is to sway volatile voters to their camp. As no neutral *Get Out To Vote* campaigns are present in Montenegro, all mobilization efforts are in the same time partisan efforts to mobilize voters not just to vote but to vote for a specific party. If the findings of partisan mobilization are transferable to Montenegrin political context, I would expect that political contact increases electoral turnout:

(H1) Partisan political mobilization increases electoral turnout.

Previously I mentioned that the literature consensus on mobilization techniques being quite successful in taking voters to the polls. Along those lines, focus has shifted on a similar but different question. Namely, which type of mobilization techniques is more effective in both getting voters out to the polls and doing that in a cost-effective manner?

If this question was asked to a consultant, most likely the advice would be to use door-to-door campaigns combined with targeted mailing in small districts, while larger electorates should be addressed through mass advertising on TV and radio

⁶ Note that initially, the Gerber and Green (2000) claimed that phone calls actually *reduce* turnout, but the results were retracted and altered since the publication of Imai (2005) critique on the experimental and analytical procedures employed.

(Fachers, 2002; cited in Nickerson 2006). Similarly, scholars have consistently found evidence of a causal relationship between door-to-door canvassing and higher turnout (Gerber and Green 1999, 2000), successful voter mobilization for minority groups (Michelson 2003), door-to-door and mobilization of low propensity voters in high turnout elections (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009), or the superiority of personal canvassing compared to phone and leaflet mobilization (Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006). Usually such findings are rationalized by arguing that door-to-door canvassing is effective because it represents a personalized effort on the part of political parties (Nickerson 2007) or neutral *Get Out To Vote* (GOTV) campaigns.

On the other hand, scholars have evaluated the causal implications of other mobilization techniques finding strong evidence to support the claim of a causal relationship between phone call canvassing (Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006; Adams and Smith 1980; Nickerson 2006), SMS message contact (Suarez 2006), direct mail contact (Gerber and Green 2000) and increased turnout. Not only do these studies point towards the conclusion that alternative mobilization techniques work, but phone call canvassing has been argued to be even more cost-effective in terms of time, money and effort and the overall effect magnitude on turnout (Nickerson 2007). The argument put forth here is that it is not the technique (door-to-door, phone call, SMS) itself that is effective in getting voters to the polls, but the nature of the message conveyed (Nickerson 2006). Specifically, if mobilizers are able to make a personal appeal to the average voter, the mobilization technique is likely to be effective. Similarly, Nickerson (2007) has argued that the quality of the phone call (professional vs. volunteer calls) plays a significant role in the effectiveness of getting people to the polls.

As I lack systematic information on the content of the message for each contacted respondent, the focus here is on evaluating the effectiveness of canvassing techniques assuming that, as a function of a small community, same message is conveyed to voters regardless to the medium used. Along those lines, disregarding the content of the message, literature points towards a conclusion that hierarchy of mobilization techniques exists. In other words, some are more effective in mobilizing voters than the others. If I assume that the message is the same, then the choice of the canvassing technique signals some sort of party devotion and importance of specific voters. Small communities rely on face to face contact and could be argued to view other types of mobilization as disrespectful and with frivolity. Building on

the majority of literature and the fact that Montenegro is a small interrelated society, I hypothesize the following:

(H2) Personal face to face mobilization is more effective than other types of mobilization techniques.

Moving away from the general assumptions let me refer back to the example in the introduction regarding the SMS communication on the Election Day. As mentioned before, opposition party Democratic Front commissioned a communication company to distribute a message to the Montenegrin electorate on the Election Day via Viber and WhatsApp, resulting in the government instructions to internet providers to temporarily disable online communication tools. The behaviour of opposition party and government implies that both camps operated under the assumption that SMS is sufficiently effective voter mobilization and turnout boosting tool. However, was this assumption wrong? Can we really expect one isolated text message on the Election Day to significantly affect the turnout rates? According to how the events on the Election Day unfolded I can assume that it does. To test this assumption, I formulate the following hypothesis:

(H3) Mobilization via SMS on the Election Day increased turnout.

Data and Measurement

The study uses 2016 Montenegrin National Election Study data on 1214 respondents, collected shortly after parliamentary elections held on 16th October. The database provides information on individual voting behaviour as well as on whether they were specifically targeted by the electoral mobilization campaign, followed by a standard battery of demographic questions.

Dependent variables: To test the proposed hypothesis two dependent variables were used. The first, a question asked whether respondents voted or not in the previous elections. Missing answers and respondent's ineligible to vote were dropped from the analysis. The second, a question asked of respondents to recall at which time they decided for which party are they going to vote (day of the election; several days, weeks, months, prior; always vote for the same party; did not vote etc.). The answers were recoded into a dichotomous variable to represent the voters who decided for whom to vote on the Election Day opposed to those who did not vote at all.

Independent variables: The question on political mobilization was asked in two stages. The first one, the question asked whether or not the respondent was contacted by a politician or a political party throughout the course of the campaign. Further, with a logical control, only those who answered positively were asked about the details of that contact: whether it was a personal, face-to-face contact, mail contact, phone call, SMS, email or social media contact.

Matching covariates: To balance the sample I used a number of substantive and demographic variables that are valuable for understanding the voting patterns in Montenegro. Specifically, the sample was matched on how closely respondents follow politics; how much they believe corruption is spread; how they evaluate the government quality (all the mentioned variables were coded on a scale from 1 to 4, where higher numbers indicate negative evaluations); whether they are a member of a political party; whether they voted in the previous parliamentary elections in 2012; as well as gender, age, education and ethnicity.

Analysis and Results

To test the proposed hypotheses, the paper implements logistic regression MLM estimation in the first instance and then compares the results obtained with propensity score matching on the same poll of covariates. Here, propensity scores allow balancing the “treatment” and control group on a number of observed covariates, and the application of quasi-experimental estimation. Therefore, the propensity score results should remove observational bias and provide more causally interpretable results.

The variables used for matching showed that initially there were some discrepancies between the “treatment” and control group. The procedure estimates likelihood of individuals of being contacted based on a set of matching covariates and pairs a contacted and non-contacted individuals with the same propensity scores. Here, non-contacted individuals, on average, believed that corruption is more widely spread in Montenegro -they were older, with higher percentage of women in the group, less educated and with slightly different religious affiliation (Table 1). Matching procedure produced a relatively balanced sample reducing the mean difference in corruption spread to 0.02 (non-significant), age 0.08 (non-significant), education

0.05 (non-significant), male 0.04 (non-significant) and religion. Apart from these, matching produced a more nuanced balance on the remaining matching covariates. For its success in balancing the samples, the same procedure was used in subsequent modelling.

To test the first hypothesis, I fitted a logistic regression model where the dependent variable was a dummy indicating whether respondents voted or not on 2016 parliamentary election. Simple regression results indicate that, controlled for a number of consequential variables, political contact during the campaign was insignificant in mobilizing voters.

Table 1. Matching Covariates

	<i>Matching Criteria: Political Contact</i>	
	Contacted	Not Contacted
	Mean	Mean
Voted 2012	0.811	0.78
Following Politics	2.40	2.41
Corruption Spread	1.69	1.78*
Government Quality	2.6	2.62
Party Membership	0.23	0.23
Nationality	1.67	1.6
Age	41.3	46.9***
Male	0.64	0.56**
Education	4.88	4.47**
Religion	2.35	2.14*

Note: Mean difference significant at: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The same pattern was observed when matching procedure was conducted. Contact by politicians or party representative did not have an effect on the likelihood of casting a vote. What did influence the choice to cast a vote, was previous behaviour (2.78***) where individuals who voted in the 2012 election were more likely to vote again in 2016; following politics (-0.99***) where individuals who followed politics less were less likely to vote; and corruption spread (0.47**) where individuals who believe corruption is not prevalent in the system were more likely to cast a vote. The

strongest predictor of casting a vote was membership in a political party (2.86***), as well as age (-0.02**), education (-0.2**), and religious affiliation to Serbian Orthodox Church (0.67*). Based on both regression and propensity score results, the analysis does not provide any support for the first hypothesis of mobilization techniques being effective in getting voters to the polls. Instead, controlled for political beliefs and previous voting behaviour, contact during the campaign did not result in increased likelihood of voting, therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no influence. Results are displayed in Table 2.

Moving to specific mobilization techniques, I employ the same strategy as the one outlined above. Both logistic regression and propensity scores were used to estimate the relative importance of various mobilization techniques on turnout rates (Table 3.). Contrary to the previous findings, here, the analysis revealed that some specific mobilization techniques did have an effect on turnout rates. In logistic regression, respondents contacted by phone during the elections had a smaller chance of voting (-0.98*) although the effect is significant only at alpha level of 0.1. On the other hand, matched observations do not show such a relationship but do reveal a negative effect of SMS contact on turnout (-0.2*).

Table 2. Political Mobilization and Turnout

	<i>Dependent variable: Voted</i>	
	Regression	Matching
Contact	-0.307(0.319)	-0.02(0.03)
Voted 2012	2.785*** (0.275)	
Following Politics	-0.980*** (0.172)	
Corruption Spread	0.473** (0.218)	
Government Quality	-0.024(0.183)	
Party Membership	2.859*** (1.037)	
Nationality: Montenegrin	0.066(0.422)	
Nationality: Serbian	-0.100(0.480)	
Age	-0.020**(0.009)	
Male	-0.434(0.266)	
Education	-0.198**(0.094)	
Religion: Serbian Orthodox Church	0.665*(0.400)	
Religion: Montenegrin Orthodox Church	-0.227(0.469)	
Constant	4.055*** (1.180)	
Observations - Matched Observations	920	183
Log Likelihood	-210.184	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	448.37	

Note: β with standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These results go against the general expectations on the positive effect of canvassing techniques on turnout laid out in the opening lines of this paper. However, they are in line with the expectation that in small societies face to face contact is a superior approach while other types of mobilization techniques signal disrespect and levity. Therefore, these results provide partial support for the existence of hierarchy of canvassing techniques. Still, there are additional reasons that can explain the negative effect of some canvassing techniques. Some authors assume that some parties

try to discourage voters to go to the polls, rather than to mobilize and persuade them to vote for their camp. Such strategies of vote suppression are likely to be prevalent in clientelist settings, when ballot secrecy is relatively high (Mares and Young 2016). More specifically, mobilization campaigns make a choice between promises and threats, between swing and core voters (Mares and Young 2016). Along those lines, some have argued that brokers should target clientelism on core voters (Gans-Morse, Mazza, and Nichter 2014), while negative inducement should be used on swing voters (Gingerich and Medina 2013).

Therefore, Montenegro can represent such a case, where long lasting political polarization disables the ruling party (Democratic Party of Socialist - DPS) to effectively mobilize swing voters, rather forcing them to employ the strategy of turnout suppression. These assumptions are leveraged on several arguments. The first, DPS has a relatively stable electoral support that does not change significantly between electoral cycles⁷. Only major difference between the electoral results came in 2016 elections, the only elections, out of four, where DPS did not run in a coalition with ethnic minority parties. Consequently, that accounts for a slightly smaller electoral support. The second, it has been a long held popular opinion that increased turnout benefits opposition parties in Montenegro. This assumption is in part based on the previous observation that DPS has a stable electorate which opposition parties were unable to sway. Therefore, opposition parties should focus on mobilizing non-voters to increase their electoral success. And the third, as DPS has been in power since the introduction of pluralism (1991), long term dominance created significant level of political polarization. In such an environment, the likelihood of swaying the vote is small. Instead, at times, DPS employs a different strategy - turnout suppression of undecided and opposition voters.

The major limitation this study has, regarding these competing explanations, is that I lack systematic information on the nature of the message conveyed during contact. Therefore, evaluating whether it is a nature of the canvassing approach (phone or SMS) or the content of the message (vote suppression) is not possible in this research efforts and should be the subject of subsequent analysis of mobilization practices in Montenegro.

⁷ DPS received 164.737 votes in 2006, 168.290 in 2009, 165.380 in 2012 and 158.490 in 2016 National Parliamentary Elections (State Electoral Commission: <http://dik.co.me/>).

Table 3. Type of Mobilization and Turnout

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Regression	Matching
	β (S.E.)	β (S.E.)
Personal Contact	0.266 (0.509)	0.1 (0.07)
Mail	-0.721 (0.714)	-0.05 (0.09)
Phone	-0.982* (0.512)	-0.067 (0.07)
SMS	0.922 (0.607)	-0.2* (0.11)
E-Mail	0.468 (1.148)	-0.03 (0.12)
Social Media	-0.754 (0.750)	-0.11 (0.09)
Voted 2012	2.841* (0.283)	
Following Politics	-0.988*** (0.175)	
Corruption Spread	0.504** (0.222)	
Government Quality	0.008 (0.186)	
Party Membership	2.833*** (1.039)	
Nationality: Montenegrin	0.064 (0.429)	
Nationality: Serbian	-0.149 (0.485)	
Age	-0.023** (0.009)	
Male	-0.349 (0.270)	
Education	-0.219** (0.096)	
Religion: Serbian Orthodox Church	0.648 (0.402)	
Religion: Montenegrin Orthodox Church	-0.044 (0.488)	
Constant	4.100*** (1.205)	
Observations: Regression	912	
Matched Observations: Personal Contact		113
Matched Observations: Mail		42
Matched Observations: Phone		117
Matched Observations: SMS		81
Matched Observations: E-Mail		26
Matched Observations: Social Media		39
Log-Likelihood	-206.872	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	451.745	

Note: β with standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Finally, I turn to testing the final hypothesis. Here, the poll of eligible voters includes those who decided for which party to vote on the Election Day and those who did not vote at all. The logic is that the message sent on Viber and WhatsApp had the potential of mobilizing and swaying only those who did not know for whom they are going to vote on the Election Day. This decision limited the available sample, especially in the matching procedure where I ended up with 16 treated observations to be matched. Regardless of this limitation, both procedures presented the same result. Taking into account previous voting behaviour, political attitudes and demography, reception of SMS message did not have an effect on the overall turnout rate in 2016 parliamentary elections.

Table 4. SMS Contact and Election Day Decision

	<i>Decided to Vote on Election Day</i>	
	Regression	Matching
	β (S.E.)	β (S.E.)
SMS	2.269 (1.391)	0.21 (0.18)
Personal Contact	-2.394 (1.669)	
Phone	-1.659 (1.385)	
Mail	0.927 (1.500)	
E-Mail	6.079* (3.272)	
Social Media	-5.605** (2.311)	
Voted	3.236*** (0.712)	
Following Politics	-0.729* (0.392)	
Corruption Spread	0.926* (0.542)	
Government Quality	0.893** (0.445)	
Party Membership	19.881 (1,956.820)	
Nationality: MNE	0.469 (0.971)	
Nationality: SRB	-0.826 (1.056)	
Age	-0.066*** (0.023)	
Male	-0.561 (0.595)	
Education	-0.186 (0.214)	
Religion: Srb. Orthodox Church	1.153 (0.832)	
Religion: Mne. Orthodox Church	3.493** (1.391)	
Constant	-1.026 (2.628)	
Observations (Matched)	138	16
Log-Likelihood	-54.041	
Akaike. Inf. Crit.	140.081	

Note: β with standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Discussion and Conclusion

This study represents the first effort in evaluating the success of voter mobilization techniques in a small and ethnically divided Montenegrin society. The study focused on three major questions: Whether political contact is effective in mobilizing voters; Is there a hierarchy of techniques in terms of effectiveness in taking voters to the polls; and Whether specific message of the Election Day in October 2016 had any effect on turnout rates. The analysis revealed that, in general, political contact was unrelated to overall turnout rates, while phone and SMS contacts were related to decreased turnout. This specific finding points towards two possible conclusions. The first one, in line with literature findings that face to face canvassing is the most effective way of voter mobilization, these results partially support such claims as phone and SMS decrease voter turnout. Through this paper I have argued that this can be a function of disrespect and levity that such techniques may signal to voters in a small and inter-related communities. In other words, voters may feel that they are not as important to the party as others who have been approached face to face. Therefore, not voting can be viewed as some sort of protest against party who did not put forth significant effort to persuade the voter to take to the polls.

The second, phone and SMS contact may be addressed to swing voters or voters of the opposing political block and may be used to convey a voter suppression message. This study lacked systematic data to evaluate these two competing explanations for the results obtained. Future research on this topic should evaluate the specific strategies parties employ in mobilizing voters, especially focusing on disentangling the nature of the message. Here, I am refereeing to the prevalence of strategies for vote mobilization or vote suppression.

Last but not the least, this study found no evidence that SMS message on the Election Day influenced turnout rates. This finding contradicts both the strategy of opposition parties to use SMS as mobilization tool on the Election Day, as well as the government response to shut down communication through Viber and WhatsApp. Considering the deep political divisions in the electorate and predefined “blocks” of voting, single information about alleged illegal activity to tip the electoral results in the favour of DPS was insufficient to mobilize swing voters.

REFERENCES

- Adams, William C., and Dennis J. Smith. 1980. "Effects of Telephone Canvassing on Turnout and Preferences: A Field Experiment." 44 (3): 389–395.
- Arceneaux, Kevin, and David W. Nickerson. 2009. "Who Is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-Analysis of 11 Field Experiments." 53 (1): 1–16.
- Blydenburgh, John C. 1971. "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact Campaigning." 15 (2): 365–381.
- Gans-Morse, Jordan, Sebasti´an Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2014. "Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections." 58 (2): 415–432.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 1999. "Does canvassing increase voter turnout? A field experiment." 96 (19): 10939–10942.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." 94 (03): 653–663.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2001. "Do Phone Calls Increase Voter Turnout?: A Field Experiment." 65 (1): 75–85.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2005. "Do Phone Calls Increase Voter Turnout? An Update." 601: 142–154.
- Gingerich, Daniel W., and Luis Fernando Medina. 2013. "The Endurance and Eclipse of the Controlled Vote: A Formal Model of Vote Brokerage Under the Secret Ballot." 25 (3): 453–480.
- Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2015. *Get out the vote: How to increase voter turnout*. Brookings Institution Press.
- Imai, Kosuke. 2005. "Do Get-Out-the-Vote Calls Reduce Turnout? The Importance of Statistical Methods for Field Experiments." 99 (2): 283–300.
- Mares, Isabela, and Lauren E. Young. 2016. *The core voter's curse: Coercion and clientelism in Hungarian elections*. Technical Report. Working paper, Columbia University.
- Michelson, Melissa R. 2003. "Getting out the Latino Vote: How Door-to-Door Canvassing Influences Voter Turnout in Rural Central California." 25 (3): 247–263.
- Miller, Roy E., David A. Bositis, and Denise L. Baer. 1981. "Stimulating Voter Turnout in a Primary: Field Experiment with a Precinct Committeeman." 2 (4): 445–460.
- Nickerson, D. W. 2006. "Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout: Evidence From Eight Field Experiments." 34 (3): 271–292.
- Nickerson, David W. 2007. "Quality Is Job One: Professional and Volunteer Voter Mobilization Calls." 51 (2): 269–282.

Nickerson, David W., Ryan D. Friedrichs, and David C. King. 2006. "Partisan Mobilization Campaigns in the Field: Results from a Statewide Turnout Experiment in Michigan." 59 (1): 85–97.

Osborn, Tracy, Scott D. McClurg, and Benjamin Knoll. 2010. "Voter Mobilization and the Obama Victory." 38 (2): 211–232.

Panagopoulos, Costas. 2011. "Timing Is Everything? Primacy and Recency Effects in Voter Mobilization Campaigns." 33 (1): 79–93.

Suárez, Sandra L. 2006. "Mobile Democracy: Text Messages, Voter Turnout and the 2004 Spanish General Election." 42 (2): 117–128.